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PREFACE

The airline industry today is the leader in commercial
city passenger transportation.

In achieving this status the industry

has evolved through definite eras,
Great Depression.
eras;

beginning about the time of the

It is the purpose of this research to define these

and for each era to determine the needs of the industry,

categorize the management
industry)

inter

to

(as exemplified by the presidents of the

into business fields and to evaluate the success of mana g e 

ment in light of these needs.
The writer seeks to determine if there is a correlation
existing between the needs of the industry,
management.

Further,

success,

and type of

the writer seeks to evaluate the present and

future situation in light of the historical findings,
forecast for airline management.

vii

resulting in a
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MANAGEMENT IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

Chapter 1

THE NATURE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

Air transportation is the only truly Twentieth Century mode of
domestic transport.

Commercial air transportation began on December 4,

1913, when Paul E. Fansler organized the St. Petersburg--Tampa Airboat
Line.

Scheduled domestic commercial airline service was inaugurated

three and one-half weeks later as the airline flew its first passenger
across Tampa Bay in Florida.
D u r i n g the subsequent sixty-one years,

the airline industry

has evolved into a competitive network of highly sophisticated p r i 
vate operating companies.

Two forces have been primarily responsible

for this fantastic growth--war and the government.
It was during World War I that the airplane was recognized as
a viable instrument of warfare and was therefore developed by the
government.

Previously,

all aircraft development had been by private

industry with their rather limited resources.

By the end of the war

aircraft w e r e becoming sophisticated and dependable, pilots were
numerous and highly skilled,

and the nation had suddenly become aware

of the airplane as a means of transportation.
The government

(Post Office Department) began to experiment

w i t h airmail service in 1918, w i t h transcontinental airmail service
established the following year.

The government efforts to maintain a

reliable domestic airmail service were at best only moderately
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successful.

As a result,

Congress acted to create the United States

airline industry by passing the Contract Air Mail Act
the Kelly Act) in 1925.

(also known as

The act put the transportation of mail by

air into private hands by means of competitive bidding for air mail
routes.

The following year Congress passed the Air Commerce Act.

w h i c h provided for the establishment of airways and navigational aids
the licensing of pilots and aircraft,, and the investigation of air
plane accidents.

While the Air Commerce Act gave the government more

control of the newly emerging airline industry,

it gave the industry

much needed navigational aids and set standards to preserve the
industry.
Since 1926 the air mail has been transported solely by privat
airline companies, w ith the exception of a disastrous three-month
period of government transportation in 1934.

However,

even though

ownership and operation of the industry have been in private hands
since 1926,

the government has strictly controlled and regulated it.

Early airmail carriers were required by the government to
provide facilities for transporting passengers along with the mail.
The government hoped that passenger revenues

to the airlines would

reduce the necessary government subsidies paid to the companies
transporting the mail.

for

It should be noted that the early airline

companies were not only dependent upon the government for financial
sustenance to operate,
for airways too.

but they w e r e dependent on the government

The federally maintained airways remain today

although subsidies are no longer given to the trunklines.
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Throughout the 1930s travel by air remained primarily e m e r 
gency travel w h ere speed was of the utmost importance.

Air travel at

this point in time was expensive and uncomfortable by the standards of
today.
In the 1940s, World War II stimulated aircraft development and
again increased awareness of the airplane as a means of transporta
tion.

Airline passenger volume increased immensely due to the demands

of the war, resulting in prosperity and high earnings to the airline
industry.

This trend continued after the war because of several

factors:

The trunklines expanded their route mileage,

ules w e r e offered,

equipment became very reliable,

frequent sc h e d 

and the competitive

pressures between airline companies drove fares down.
Development of aircraft continued at a rapid pace even after
the war due to the demand for increased passenger capacity as more
people began to fly,
comfort,

the demand for increased speed and increased

and the demand for increased flying ranges as routes were

expanded and lengthened.

By the 1950s the first turbojet aircraft

had been put into service and air transportation for the first time
was carrying more passengers than any other form of domestic trans
portation.

Also significant in the 1950s is the fact that airlines

b egan carrying freight on a regular basis.
In the 1960s,

the pure jets were put into widespread service

b ringing new dimensions
airline industry.

in capacity,

speed,

comfort,

and range in the

Already in the 1970s the jumbo jet generation has

been developed to meet and exceed the growing demands for air
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transportation.
Table 1 shows the progress
1930s.

in aircraft development since the

Table 2 sho\7s the growth of the airline industry since 1926.
Since W o rld War II the aircraft manufacturing industry has

seen tc it that the airline industry has had all the passenger cap
acity it has needed--and more.
exceeded the break-even point
prosperity),

As airline load factors have
(resulting in most cases in financial

the aircraft manufacturers have introduced a bigger

and better and moie expensive type of aircraft.
pressures

The competitive

forced all the companies in the industry to buy the newest

and best aircraft.

Purchase of the new aircraft required huge

investments w hich necessitated heavy borrowing by the entire industry.
After purchase load factors were always lowered as capacity of the
new planes rose

(and passenger growth remained near constant),

resulting in poor,

if any, profits.

As load factors passed the b r e a k 

even point a newer and better aircraft would be introduced and the
cycle would start all over again.
There is no doubt that the domestic economic situation has
influenced the profits of the airline industry,

but the effect seems

to be minimal when compared with the effects of the aircraft m a n u 
facturing industry.

Figure 1 (a graph) demonstrates the relationship

between domestic airline industry net profits,
economy,

the United States*

and the introduction of new aircraft.
M a n y believe the airlines are headed down a path similar to

that of the railroads.

They cite the constant overcapacity and the

6

Table 1
A ircr a f t Development,

Years

Type of plane

1930s through 1970s

Capacity
(passenger
seats)

1930s

DC-3

1940s

DC-4, C-46,

Cruising
speed
(mph)

Normal
range
(miles)

30

200

2,000

50 to 60

250

3,000

80 to 95

325

4,000

140 to 250

550

5,000

350 to 500

600

6,000

Co nstella
tion
1950s

Comet, Electra,
DC-6, DC-7,
Super Con
stellation

1960s

B - 7 0 7 , CV-880,
DC-8

1970s

B-747, DC-10,
L-1011

Source:
Taylor, John W. R . , ed.
J a n e ’s All the W o r l d ’s A i r c r a f t ,
1941, 1954-1955, 1966-1967.
N ew York:
McGraw Hill Book Co., 1941,
1954-1955, 1966-1967.
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Table 2
Domestic Scheduled Airline Industry
G r ow th— 1926 through 1970

Year

Total revenue
passenger
miles traveled

(thousands)

Total revenue
passengers
enplaned

Total
passenger
revenue

(thousands)

(thousands
of dollars)

1926

1,272

6

1931

106,442

1936

Total
investment

(thousands
of dollars)

NAa

NA

472

NA

NA

388,242

929

NA

NA

1941

1,377,152

3,849

96,391

63,217

1946

5,903,111

12,164

314,517

262,535

1951

10,210,726

22,711

721,257

375,723

1956

21,643,140

41,937

1,367,367

765,243

1961

29,534,792

52,703

2,214,120

1,988,875

1966

56,802,788

97,746

4,070,635

3,411,305

104,155,983

153,408

7,066,115

5,000,000

1970b

^Not available,
b

Total investment for 1970 is an estimate.

Source:
Civil Aeronautics Board.
"Handbook of Airline Statistics,"
1971 Edition.
Washington, D . C . : N.p., 1971.
[ Booklet. ]
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Airline
net
profits

DC-6,
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B-707,
DC-8,
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B-747,
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Figure 1. Comparison of Gross National Product (GNP), Airline
Industry Net Profits, and New Aircraft Introduction.
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high debt equity ratio occasioned by reequipment cycles as justifica
tion.

Stifling regulation is also cited as a contributing factor.
Ever since the passage of the Contract Air Mail Act and the

Air Commerce Act., Congress has strictly regulated the airline indus
try through the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).
was originally designed to be promotional,
preserve the new industry,

While the legislation

i.e., to encourage and

subsequent legislation has been regulatory

and almost to the point of b eing oppressive.

Today the government

regulates routes;

and maintenance;

personnel;

aircraft design,

navigation and airways;

investigation;

ticket issuance;

operation,
fares;

airports;

flight

safety and accident
and airline facilities.

Regulation is so complete that an airline operating an
unprofitable route must continue to operate it with the same fare
unless through the long and tedious process of administration review
it can show that there is no "public convenience and necessity" being
served in operating the route or that the fare is less than "just and
reasonable."

The burden of proof is on the airline making the air

line point of view very difficult to establish beyond "a preponderance
of the evidence."
Two federal administrative agencies deal exclusively with the
airlines:

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates op e r a 

tions and routes and provides technical supervision to the airlines;
and the Civil Aeronautics Board is charged with the economic regula
tion and promotion of the airlines.

It should be noted that the

airlines are the only mode of transportation which Congress has
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specifically legislated to promote.

However, the legislation also

provides that the airlines are to be competitive with other modes of
transportation, taking into account the inherent advantages of each
mode.

Chapter 2

DEFINITION OF ERAS IN AIRLINE
INDUSTRY GROWTH

The United States'

domestic airline industry has progressed

through definite eras in its growth.
the early years,

the growth years,

These eras may be defined as

and the crisis years.

The early years are characterized by the dependency of the
airline companies on mail contracts for existence,

primitive aircraft,

the high cost and discomfort of passenger air travel,
tic route structure,
background.

the mon o p o l i s 

and a management by people with an operational

The era commences with the beginning of commercial

aviation in 1913 and extends up to the outbreak of World War II.
During this period passenger travel was light,
mail service flourished.

Aircraft were small,

and could fly only short ranges.

although air

slow, uncomfortable,

Many of the aircraft we r e designed

to carry mail and passenger seats were an afterthought.
Although air mail routes were bid for on a competitive basis,
there was only one route between any two cities.
airline company got a route,

it had a monopoly

Hence,

once the

(no other company could

carry mail over that route and it was financially impossible for an
airline to exist carrying only passengers).

Management of these young

companies usually doubled as pilots and, in some cases,
mechanics.

This was the era of Eddie Rickenbacker
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even as

(Eastern Air L i n e s ) ,
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Juan Trippe (Pan A merican World Airways),

and W i l l i a m Patterson

(United

Air Lines).
What is dubbed the growth era begins at the outbreak of World
War II and runs up until the beginning of the jet age,
This era is characterized by huge passenger growth,
and improved aircraft,

lower fares,

roughly 1960.

greatly enlarged

and competition on routes.

W o r l d War II stimulated the development of aircraft and the
airplane as a means of mass passenger transportation.

The more

highly developed and efficient aircraft permitted the lowering of
fares.

This factor,

accompanied with a growing ax^areness of air

travel,

stimulated passenger traffic.

Nex7 legislation created compe

tition on the major

air routes now that mail contracts

bread and butter of

the industry.

were not the

Management became oriented toward

marketing as passenger traffic grew,

aircraft capacity was enlarged,

and competition between airlines over the same routes became keen.
The crisis era begins with the outset of the jet age and runs
up to the present.

The

the airline companies.

crisis refers to the financial situation of
During this period the debt to

of the airlines began to skyrocket to the point where,

equity ratios
at the present,

they approach the debt to equity ratios of the railroads.
T h e crisis was brought about by the introduction of pure jet
aircraft.

The new jet aircraft required a huge initial investment,

a large investment in spare parts,

and an additional investment in

ground equipment and facilities to accommodate the new type of air
craft.

This huge financial outlay came about at a time w h e n the
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United States economy was sluggish.

Further,

the new planes had a

much larger passenger capacity than the old propeller planes,
raising the number of passengers required on a flight to break even
(although load factor break-even points were lower e d ) .
About

the time the airlines began to recover from the effects

of breaking into the jet age,

the jumbo jet age, or wide-body jet

age, began with the introduction of the Boeing 747.
w h o l e financial crisis all over again.

This created the

This most recent financial

crisis is being further complicated by the energy crisis and the cur
rent recession.

As this is being written, May,

1975,

at least two

major United States carriers are potential candidates for bankruptcy-Pan American World Airways and Eastern Air Lines.

The crisis era is

characterized also by new horizons in aircraft speeds,
ranges.

comfort,

and

Chapter 3

EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE OF SELECTED
AIRLINE COMPANY PRESIDENTS

On the following pages the education and experience of t h e v
past and present airline company presidents are analyzed.

Those

airlines w h o s e presidents are considered include the major trunk
carriers of the United States,

i.e., American Airlines,

Airways,

Eastern Airlines, Delta Airlines

Continental Airlines,

National Airlines,

Braniff

Northwest Airlines, Pan American World Airways,

Trans W orld Airlines,

and United Airlines.

In each case every

president of the airline is examined from the incorporation of the
company until the present.
A n attempt is made to classify each president by the primary
emphasis of his occupational experience prior to his becoming an
airline president.

A president's educational background is also

considered where it is known, but to a lesser degree than his oc c u 
pational experience.

The writer has concluded from his research that

educational background, w h ere known, has had little apparent influence
on the career of airline presidents,

but rather the primary influence

has been one's occupational background.
The classification used on the succeeding pages is as follows:
1.

Little or no business background.

The president

started his position w ith practically no business experience and in

14
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most cases started the airline company as his first business expe
rience,
2.

General business background.

The president had no

specific training or experience in any particular specialized area
of business but had worked in various areas of business at the time
he took over his position as president.
gory have,

The presidents of this cate

in most cases, had broad managerial experience in undefined

or multiple areas of business.
3.

Financial background.

The president has had his p r e 

dominant experience in the financial aspects of business.
4.

M a r k e t i n g background.

The

president has had his p r e 

dominant experience in the marketing and sales aspects of business.
5.

Personnel background.

The

president has had his p r e 

dominant experience in the field of personnel.
6.

Milit a r y background.

The president has had his p r e 

dominant experience with the United States Armed Forces.
7.

Operational background.

The president has had his pre

dominant experience in the operational aspects of business.
8.

Legal background.

The president has had his predomin

ant experience in the practice of law,

including private,

corporate,

and administrative practice.
9.

Unknown background.

The researcher was unable to

obtain enough information as to the president's education and expe
rience to

make a judgment as to one of the

other classifications.

A MERICAN AIRLINES

pro

logy of Presidents
Cyrus R. Smith

1934-1942

Ralph Damon

1945-1949

Cyrus R. Smith

1949-1964

Ma r i o n Sadler

1964-1968

George A,

1968-1972

Spater

G. A. Warde

1972-1974

Albert V. Casey

1974-
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Cyrus R. Smith

Education
BBA, University of Texas

Experience
Commercial pilot

(although never flew professionally)

B a n k teller
B ookkeeper at cotton mill
Public accountant
Junior officer, public utility company
Treasurer, Texas Air Transport,

Inc.

V i c e President,

Texas Air Transport,

Inc.

Vice President,

Southern Air Transport,

Inc.

Vice President of Operations, American Airlines
Deputy Commander, Air Transport Command, U.S. Air Force
President, American Airlines

Classification:

2.
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Ralph S. D amon

Education
A B , Harvard

Ex perience
Factory superintendent, Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co.
President, Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co.
Vice President and factory manager, Curtiss Robertson
Airplane Mfg.

Co.

Assistant to the executive Vice President, Curtiss
Wright Corp.
Vice President and general manager,

Curtiss Wright

Airplane Co.
President,

Curtiss Wright Airplane Co.

Vice President and factory manager, Keystone Aircraft
Corp.
Vice President--Operations, American Airlines
President, Republic Aviation
Vice President and general manager, American Airlines
President, A merican Airlines
President, Trans W orld Airlines

Classification:

2.
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M a r i o n Sadler

Education
AB, Duke. University
MA, Duke University

(English major)

Experience
Teacher
District sales manager, American Airlines
Director of Passenger Sales, American Airlines
Vice President--customer service, American Airlines
Vice President and general manager, American Airlines
President, A merican Airlines

Classification:

4.

AB, University of Michigan
JD, University of Michigan

Ex perience
Lawyer;

Cbadbourne,

Park, Whiteside,

& Wolff;

New York

City
Executive Vice President and general counsel, American
Airlines
Vice Chairman, American Airlines
President, American Airlines

Classification:

8.

21

G. A. Warde

Education
Attended University of Alabama
Attended Hofstra College

Experience
Foreman, American Export Airlines
Superintendent--line maintenance, Pan American World
Airways
Production manager--California,

Eastern Airlines

Apprentice mechanic, American Airlines
General production manager, American Airlines
Vice President--maintenance, American Airlines
V i c e President--maintenance and engineering, American
Airlines
Senior Vice P r e s i de n t - - o p e r a t i o n s , American Airlines
President, American Airlines

Classification:

2.

Albert V. Casey

Education
AB, Harvard
MBA, Harvard

Experience
Assistant Vice President— finance,

Southern Pacific

Railroad
Vice President— finance,
Assistant treasurer,

Southern Pacific Railroad

Southern Pacific Railroad

Vice P r esident— finance, Railroad Express Agency
Vice President--finance, Times Mirror Co.
publisher)
Executive Vice President, Times Mirror Co.
President, Times Mirror Co.
President, A merican Airlines

Classification:

3.

(newspaper
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BRANIFF AIRWAYS

Chronology of Presidents
T o m E. Braniff

1930-1954

Charles E. Beard

1954-1964

Harding L. Lawrence

1965-1970

C. Edward Acker

1970-

T homas E . Braniff

Education
Two years of high school

Experience
Insurance agent
Owner, Braniff Investment Co.
Owner,

President and Chairman of the board, Prudential

Fire Insurance Co.
President, Braniff Airways

Classification:

2
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Charles E. Beard

Education
Attended Lake Forest College
Attended University of Toledo

Experience
Newspaper reporter
Professional theatre actor on Broadway
Owner, heavy hardware and implement business
Secretary and manager, Chicago Air Traffic Association
Passenger traffic manager, Northwest Orient Airlines
General traffic manager, Braniff Airways
Vice President— traffic and sales, Braniff Airways
Executive Vice President, Braniff Airways
President, Braniff Airways

Classification:

4

26

Harding L. Lawrence

Education
BBA, University of Texas
LLB, South Texas College of L a w

Experience
Assistant to the Vice Pre‘sident--Operations, Pioneer

Air Lines
General sales manager and Vice President--sales,
Pioneer Air Lines
Vi c e P r esident— traffic and sales, Pioneer Air Lines
Executive Vice President--traffic and sales, Continental
Airlines
Executive Vice President, Continental Airlines
President, Braniff Airways

Classification:

4
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C.

Edward Acker

Education
BA, Southern Methodist University (major in economics
and psychology)

Experience
Stock broker
V ice President, Lionel D. Edie & Co.

(investment

counsel and economic consultants)
Vice President--finance,

Greatamerica Corp.

Senior Vice President--planning and administration,
Br a niff Airways
Executive Vice President and general manager, Braniff
Airways
President, Braniff Airways

Classification:

2

28

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES

Chronology of Presidents
Robert F. Six

1938-

29

Robert F. Six

Education
High school

Experience
Pilot
Owner and operator, Valley Flying Service
District circulation manager,

MSan Francisco Chronicle"

Coowner, M o uton and Six (aircraft distributors)
General manager, Varney Speed (air) Lines
President,

Cl assification:

Continental Airlines

7

30

D E L T A AIR LINES

Chronology

of P residents

D.

Y. Smith

1928-1934

C.

E. Faulk

1934-1945

C.

E. Woolman

1945-1965
#

C.

H. Dolson

1965-1970

W.

T. Beebe

1970-1971

David C. Garrett,

Jr.

1971-

31

D.

Y. Smith

Education

Experience

Classification:

9

32

C. E. Faulk

Education
Grammar school

Experience
Owner, M o nroe News Star Publishing Co.
Owner and publisher; Longview, Texas,
President,

Classification:

Delta Air Lines

2

"News and Journal”

33

C. E. Wool man

Education

BS, University of Illinois (major in agricultural
engineering)

Experience

County agricultural agent, Shreveport, Louisiana
District agricultural agent, northern Louisiana
Vice President and field manager, Huff, Dalund Dusters
(crop dusting company)
Vice President and general manager, Huff, Dalund
Dusters
Vice President and general manager, Delta Air Lines
President, Delta Air Lines

Classification:

2

34

G. K. Poison

Education

BS, Washington University (civil engineering major)

Experience

Test pilot, Curtiss-Wright Airplane Co.
Pilot, American Airlines*
Pilot, Delta Air Lines
Chief pilot, Delta Air Lines
Operations manager, Delta Air Lines
Vice President— operations, Delta Air Lines
Executive Vice President— operations, Delta Air Lines
President, Delta Air Lines

Classification:

7

35

W i l l i a m T. Beebe

Education
BBA, University of Minnesota

Experience
College trainee,

General Electric Co.

Personnel manager, United Aircraft Corp.
Vice President--personnel and labor relations,

Chicago

and Southern Air Lines
Vice President--personnel, Delta Air Lines
Senior Vice President--administration,
President,

Classification:

Delta Air Lines

5

Delta Air Lines

36

David C, Garrett, Jr.

Education
BA, Furman University
MS,

Georgia Institute of Technology

Experience
Worked in the marketing division of Delta Air Lines
D i r e c t o r — methods and training department, Delta Air

Lines
D i r e c t o r - p l a n n i n g and coordination of jet introduction
program, Delta Air Lines
Assistant of the executive Vice President— oper a t i o n s ,
D e l t a Air Lines
Assistant Vice P r esident— operations,

Delta Air Lines

Vice President*— o p e r ations, Delta Air Lines
Senior Vice P r e s i dent— operations, Delta Air Lines
President, Delta Air Lines

Classification;

7

37

EASTERN A I R LINES

Chronology of Presidents
Edward V, Rickenbacker

1938-1953

Thomas F. Armstrong

1954-1958

M a l c o l m A. MacIntyre

1959-1963

Floyd D. Hall

1963-1967

Arthur D. Lev/is

1968-1970

Samuel L. H i g g inbottom

1970-1973

Floyd D. Hall

1973-

38

Edward V. Rickenbacker

Education

Experience
Pilot
President, Rickenbacker Motor Co.

(automobile

manufacturing)
Vice President and director of sales, General Aviation
Manufacturing Co.
Vice President, American Airways
Vice President, North American Aviation, Inc.
General manager, Eastern Air Lines
President, Eastern Air Lines

Classification:

2

39

Thomas F. Armstrong

Education

Experience
Secretary,

Eastern Air Lines

Treasurer,

Eastern Air Lines

President,

Eastern Air Lines

Classification:

2

40

M a l c o l m A. MacIntyre

Education
BA, Yale
BA, Oxford
JD, Yale

Ex p e r i e n c e
Various legal jobs with law firms
Corporate counsel, American Airlines
Under-secretary of the U.S. Air Force
Assistant secretary of defense
President,

Classification:

Eastern Air Lines

8

41

Floyd D. H a l l

Education

BS, University of Colorado
MBA, University of Michigan

Experience

Various management positions at Trans World Airlines
General manager— U. S. operations, Trans World Airlines
Vice President--flight operations, Trans World Airlines
Vice President and general transportation manager,
Trans World Airlines
Senior Vice President and system general manager,
Trans World Airlines
President, Eastern Air Lines

Classification:

7

42

Arthur D. Lewis

Education
Student, University of Texas
Student, Harvard

Experience
Manager of economic analysis, American Airlines
Director of economic planning, American Airlines
Assistant Vice President— planning, American Airlines
Executive Vice President, Hawaiian Airlines
President, Hawaiian Airlines
Senior Vice President and general manager, Eastern Air
Lines
President, Eastern Air Lines

Classification:

2

43

Samuel L. Higginbottom

Education
BS, Columbia University (major in civil engineering)
Advanced management training program, Harvard
Business School

Experience

Design engineer
Various supervisory positions, Trans World Airlines
Vice President--engineering, flight test, and
inspection, Trans World Airlines
Vice President--operations group, Eastern Air Lines
Senior Vice President— engineering and maintenance,
Eastern Air Lines
President, Eastern Air Lines

Classification:

2

44

N ATIONAL AIRLINES

Chronology of Presidents
George T. Baker

1934-1962

L. B. Maytag, Jr.

1962-

Education
High school

Experience
Pilot
Owner of aircraft charter service
President,

Classification:

National Airlines

7

46

L. B. Maytag,

Jr.

Education
BBA,

Colorado College

E xperience
Founded M a y t a g Aircraft Corp.

(flight school, private

aircraft maintenance)
Licensed pilot with commercial rating
President, Frontier Airlines
President,

Classification:

National Airlines

2

47

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES

Chronology of Presidents

Croil Hunter

1933-1954

D onald W. Nyrop

1954-

48

C r oil Hunter

Education
BA, Yale

Experience
Filot
Treasurer, Fargo Mercantile Go.
New Y o r k manager, First Bancredit Corp.
Traffic manager, Northwest Orient Airlines
Vice President and general manager, Northwest Orient
Airlines
President,

Classification:

Northwest Orient Airlines

2

49

Donald W. N yro p

Education
AB, Doane College
LLB, George Washington University

Experience
Private law practice
Attorney general counsel's office, Civil Aeronautics
Board
Executive officer to the chairman, Civil Aeronautics
Board
Deputy administrator for operations, Civil Aeronautics
Board
Administrator, Civil Aeronautics Board
Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board
President, Northwest Orient Airlines

Classification:

8

50

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS

Chronology of Presidents
Juan T. Trippe

1927-1964

Harold E. Gray

1964-1968

Najeeb E. Halaby

1968-1971

W i l l i a m T. Seawell

1971-

51

Juan T . Trippe

Edu cation
BA, Yale

E xperience
President, L o n g Island Airways
M a n a g i n g director,

Colonial Air Transport

Pilot
President,

Classification:

Pan American World Airways

7

Ed u c a t ion
BS, University of Detroit

(major in mechanical

engineering)

Experience
Pilot, Ford M otor Co.
Pilot, Pan American World Airways
Chief p i l o t — Atlantic division, Pan American World
Airways
Operations manager, Pan American World Airways
Division m a n a g e r - P a c i f i c and Alaska division, Pan
American W o rld Airways
Vice President--Pacific and Alaska division, Pan
American W o rld Airways
Executive Vice P r esident— Atlantic division, Pan
American World Airways
Executive Vice P r e s i d e n t - o v e r s e a s division, Pan
American World Airways
President, Pan American World Airways

Classification:

2

Najeeb E. Kalaby

Education
AB, Stanford
LLB, Yale
Postgraduate work, University of Michigan L a w School

Experience
Lawyer,

O'Melveny and Myers, Los Angeles

Production test pilot, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
Foreign affairs advisor to the secretary of defense
Deputy assistant secretary of defense
Vice President,

Servomechanisms,

Executive Vice President,

Inc.

Servomechanisms,

Inc.

President, American Technical Corp.
Vice President,
Professor,

Janass Corp.

University of California--Los Angeles

Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
President,

Classification:

Pan American World Airways

2

54

W i l l i a m T. Seawell

Education
BS, U. S. M ilitary Academy
LLB, Harvard

Experience
Brigadier general, U. S. Air Force
Deputy secretary of defense
V ice P r esident— o p e r a t i o n s and engineering, Air Transport
A sso c i a t i o n of America
Vice Presi d e n t — operation planning, American Airlines
Vice P r e s i d e n t - - f light, American Airlines
Senior Vice Pres i dent--operations, American Airlines
President, Rolls Royce Aero Engines, Inc.
President, Pan A m erican World Airways

Classification:

7

55

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES

Chronology of Presidents
H. M. Hanshue

1930-1931

R ichard W. Robbins

1931-1934

J ack Frye

1934-1947

L aMotte T. Cohu

1947-1948

Ralph S. Damon

1949-1956

Carter L. Burgess

1957-1957

Charles S. Thomas

1958-1960

Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr.

1961-1969

F. C. Wiser, Jr.

1969-

56

Harris M. Hanshue

Education

Experience
Race car driver
Car dealer
President, Western Air Express
President, Trans World Airlines

Classification:

1

57

Richard W. Robbins

Education

E xperience

Classification:

9

58

Jack Frye

Education
High school

Experience
Pilot
Vice President, Aero Company of California
President, Aero Company of California
Vice President--operations, Western Air Express Corp.
Vice President--operations, Transcontinental and
W e s t e r n Air, Inc.
President, Transcontinental and Western Air,
President, Trans World Airlines

Classification:

7

Inc.

59

L aMotte T. Cohu

E d u cation
AB, Princeton

Experience
Security salesman
President, Air Investors,

Inc.

President, Aviation Corp.
President, North A merican Aviation,

Inc.

Chairman of the Board and general manager, Northrop
Aircraft,

Inc.
President,

Classification:

Trans World Airlines

2

60

Ralph S. Damon

E d u cation
A B , Harvard

Experience
Factory superintendent,
President,

Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co.

Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co.

Vice President and factory manager,
A irplane Mfg.

Curtiss Robertson

Co.

Assistant to the executive Vice President, Curtiss
W r ight Corp.
Vice President and general manager,

Curtiss Wright

A irp l a n e Co.
President,

Curtiss Wright Airplane Co.

Vice President and factory manager, Keystone Aircraft
Corp.
Vice Pres i d e n t - - o perations, American Airlines
President, Republic Aviation
Vice President and general manager, American Airlines
President, American Airlines
President, Trans W o r l d Airlines

Classification:

2

Career L. Burgess

Education
BA, Virginia Mili t ary Institute

Experience.
Assistant to the President, Trans World Airlines
Director of administration,

General Aniline and F i l m

Corp.
Assistant to the President, University of South
Carolina
Assistant secretary, U. S. Department of Defense
President, American Machine and Foundry Co,
President, Trans World Airlines

Classification:

2

Charles S . Thomas

EducaLion
A ttended University of California
Attended Cornell University

Experience
Under secretary of the Navy
Assistant secretary of defense for supply and logistics
Secretary of the Navy
President,

Classification:

Trans World Airlines

6

63

Charles C, Tillinghast,

Jr.

Education
BA, Brown University
LLB, Columbia Law School

Experience
Lawyer; Hughes,

Schurman & Dwight;

New York City

Deputy assistant attorney general, New York County
Vice President--international operations, Bendix Corp.
President,

Classification:

Trans World Airlines

8

64

F. C. Wiser,

Jr.

Education
BS, U. S. Naval Academy
MBA, Harvard

Experience
Assistant to executive Vice President, Container
Corporation of America
V ice President, Pittsburgh Standard Conduit Co.
Assistant to Vice P r e s ident— operations planning,
A m e r i c a n Airlines
Vice P r e s i d e n t - - o perations, American Airlines
V i c e President--technical services, American Airlines
President and chief executive officer, Northeast
Airlines
President, Trans World Airlines

Classification:

2

UNITED A I R LINES

onology of Presidents
W i l l i a m A. Patterson

1934-1963

George E. K eck

1963-1971

Edward E. Carlson .

1971-1974

Richard J. Ferris

1974-

66

W i l l i a m A. Patterson

Education
High school

Experience
Associated w ith Wells Fargo Bank,

San Francisco

Assistant to President, Boeing Air Transport
Vice President, United Air Lines
President,

Classification:

United Air Lines

2

67

George E . Keck

Education

BS, University of Illinois

Experience
Acting plant manager, O w e n s — Illinois Can Co.
W o r k a n a l y s t — industrial engineering department,
United Air Lines
D i r e c t o r - i n d u s t r i a l engineering department, United Air
Lines
Vice P r e s i d e n t - b a s e maintenance, United Air Lines
Executive Vice P r e s ident— o p e r a t i o n s , United Air Lines
Executive Vice President and general manager, United

Air Lines
♦

President,

Classification:

United Air Lines

2

68

Edward E. Carlson

Education
Attended University of Washington

Experience

Manager, President Hotel, Mt. Vernon, Washington
Manager,

Rainier Club, Seattle

Vice President, Western Hotels,

Inc.

Executive Vice President, Western Hotels, Inc.
President, Western Hotels, Inc.
Chairman of the Board, Western Hotels,
President, United Air Lines

Classification:

2

Inc.

69

Richard J. Ferris

Education

Experience
Associated with Western International hotels
President, UAL,

Inc. Food Services Division

Group Vice P r e s i d e n t - m a r k e t i n g services, United
Air Lines
President,

Classification:

United Air Lines

2

Chapter 4

NEEDS OF TEE AIRLINE INDUSTRY BY ERA

During each of the eras defined previously;
suffered a multitude of growing pains.
to are those of an industry-wide nature,
forces.

Those problems

the airlines

The growing pains referred
occasioned by external

that were specific to only one or several

carriers are not considered.
Competition in the airline industry has been keen ever since
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,

forcing an airline company to

either

fall by the wayside

cases)

or keep its position in the industry relative to the other

carriers.

As a result,

(go out of business or merge,

in most

the air carriers in existence today have

’‘grown up" together and faced similar problems along the way.

The

following pages will analyze these problems by era.
During

the early years of the airline industry,

we r e crude, unreliable,

aircraft

and of a multitude of varieties; n a v i g a 

tional equipment and airports were almost unknown;
little formal training in their occupation,

if any.

and pilots had
The major empha

sis of the early years was in overcoming these problems and the major
needs of this era were,

therefore,

of an operational nature.

Aircraft n e eded more standardization, more efficiency,
m o r e dependability.
indeed an exception.

and

An airline with two of the same type aircraft was
Parts were a constant problem as was maintenance
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of such a variety of aircraft.
Navigational equipment and airports were a inaicr stumbling
block to the airlines due to the huge investment required.

The ai r

lines we re struggling as it was to make a profit and lacked the
additional capital to build airports or navigational systems along
their routes.
Pilots n eeded to be a jack of all tr ad es --mechanic, n a v i 
gator,

and weather forecaster.

In addition they needed the ability

to fly a variety of different aircraft types and to be able to
pick a good hard landing field.

The pilots of this era were for

the most part barnstormers turned professionals.
As a result of this situation,
service unreliable.

Further,

accidents we re frequent and

the expense incurred by the ineffi

ciencies of these early operations forced, many airlines out of
business.
Until W orld War II, the airline industry had little o rg an i
zation-even

the individual airline companies had little organization.

However, w it h the tremendous growth in passenger demand occasioned
by the war,

organization became a necessity.

Legislation was enacted

during this period wh ic h furthered the organization and preservation
of the industry.

For the first time the government set standards

for aircraft, maintenance, pilots, safety and service.

Later,

fares

and the financial structure of the individual companies w ere also
regulated.
By this time routes had become competitive and to compete

72
successfully a company neede d to become more efficient in its o pe ra 
tions.

The problems of organization became bigger as the

grew in

size and newer, faster,

companies

and bigger aircraft we re introduced.

The faster and larger airplanes required paved runways to
land on

and needed accurate methods of navigation to find

ports.

No longer could an airplane land in a cow pasture.

the a i r 
Further,

the increase in passenger traffic required central collection points
for the traveling public.
over these problems

It was the government who finally took

in that the airline industry lacked the necessary

capital and organization to overcome them.
The basic need,

therefore,

during the growth era was

for

organization by the industry to cope with the multitude of growing
pains that were common to the industry and bigger than any of the
individual airline companies.
As the airlines began to refurbish their fleets and comple
ment a r y ground facilities during the early 1960s,
to raise huge quantities of capital.

it became necessary

Wide swings in'earnings had made

it difficult for most carriers to go to the equity market
n e eded additional capital.

At the same time,

debt became more scarce as returns

for the

sources for long-term

from operations dwindled.

The

orientation of the entire industry at this point was h o w to pay for
all the n e w aircraft and equipment that was about to be delivered.
This situation was further complicated by an economic recession
whi ch decreased air travel and also revenues.

And at the same time

government regulation of the airline industry had grown to the point

73
where it was stifling the alternatives available to the airline
companies.

In summary,

the m ajor need during the crisis era was for

capital to finance the continued growth of the airline industry.

Chapter 5

SUCCESS OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY BY ERA

In considering the success of the airline industry one must
take into account not only the operating r e s u l t s , but also the growth
achieved.

In Table 3 the operating results of the total domestic

trunk airline industry of the United States are compared from 1926 to
1974.

In Table 4 the growth of the total domestic trunk airline

industry of the United States is compared from 1938 to 1974.
To summarize these tables,

in the early years profits were

small as operations were inefficient, passenger travel was slight,
and the companies had to exist from their government mail subsidies.
As passenger traffic began to slowly increase and new mail routes
w e r e awarded,

there was some significant growth.

In the "growth era" growth was the major factor.

The indi

vidual airline companies w ere competitive for the first time during
this period and their competitive efforts stimulated passenger travel
immensely.

Profits

fluctuated widely depending upon new aircraft

introductions and the domestic economic climate.

The operating

results of the airline industry have always reflected the economic
situation of the country,

i.e., when the economy was booming,

profits

w e r e soaring and w h e n the country experienced a recession, profits
w e r e significantly decreased.

As mentioned earlier,

the introduction

of a n e w type of airplane always reflected adversely on the income

74
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Table 3
Operating Results— Total United S t a t e s ’
Domestic Trunk Airlines

Year

Operating
profit

Total
investment

(hundred
thousands of
dollars) '

(hundred
thousands of
dollars)

l.l)a

30.2

1939

4.6

35.8

1940

5.9

54.5

1941

7.3

61.9

1942

26.0

76.7

1943

27.0

96.1

1944

36.1

126.9

1945

33.5

168.1

1938

(

1946

(

5.2)

257.0

1947

( 20.9)

299.4

Rate of
return on
total
investment
(%)

( 4.65)

1948

2.1

319.1

2.65

1949

24.6

321.2

5.91

1950

62.6

335.7

12.09

1951

105.9

353.2

13.44

1952

95.1

417.4

14.19

1953

88.4

486.2

11.22

1954

99.5

522.5

11.21
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Table 3 (continued)

Year

Operating
profit
(hundred
thousands of
dollars)

Total
investment
(hundred
thousnads of
dollars)

Rate of
return on
total
inves tment
(%)

1955

122.6

589.9

11.85

1956

100.6

711.2

9.57

1957

42.1

903.7

4.80

1958

95.1

1,066.9

6.49

1959

105.2

1,320.7

7.12

1960

34.9

1,579.6

2.79

1961

11.1

1,829.3

1.00

1962

74.9

1,963.7

3.72

1963

129.2

1,919.3

4.02

1964

296.8

2,033.8

9.62

1965

416.2

2,369.3

12.04

1966

453.7

3,044.7

10.36

1967

410.1

6.90

1968

320.1

4.90

1969

304.4

4.30

1970

14.8

1.40

1971b

229.5

3.30

1972b

434.1

5.10

1973b

413.9

4.70
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Table 3 (continued)

Operating
profit

Y ear

(hundred
thousands of
dollars)

1974k

Total
investment
(hundred
thousands of
dollars)

Rate of
return on
total
investment
(%)

7.80

679.4

Parentheses indicate deficit.
^Includes statistics for Alaska and Hawaii.
Sources;
Civil Aeronautics Board.
1971 Edition.
Washington, D.C.:

"Handbook of Airline Statistics,"
N.p., 1971. [ Booklet. ]

A i r Transport A s s o c i ation of America.
Washington, D.C.:
N.p., 1974.
[ Booklet. ]

"Air Transport 1974."
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Table 4
G rowth— -Total United States'
Domestic Trunk Airlines

Year

Available
seat
miles

(hundred
thousands)

Annual
rate of
growth

m

Revenue
passenger
miles

(hundred
thousands)

Annual
rate of
growth

(%)

1926

1.3

1927

1.9

49.8

1928

10.5

452.5

1929

35.1

233.9

1930

84.0

139.1

1931

106.4

26.7

127.0

19.4

173.5

36.6

187.9

8.3

Total
Annual
passenger
rate
revenues
of
(hundred
thousands
of
dollars)

gr0Wth

(%)

1932

300.0

1933

370.1

1934

362.5

1935

572.5

57.9

279.4

48.7

1936

680.7

18.9

388.2

39.0

1937

828.2

21.7

407.3

4.9

1938

944.7

14.1

475.6

16.8

24.3

1939

1,209.6

28.0

679.8

42.9

34.5

42.0

1940

1,809.4

49.6

1,047.1

54.0

52.7

52.8

1941

2,330.6

28.8

1,377.2

31.5

69.0

30.9

23.4
( 2.1)a
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Table 4 (continued)

Year

Available
seat
miles

(hundred
thousands)

Annual
rate of
growth

(%)

Revenue
passenger
miles

Annual
rate of
growth

(hundred
thousands)

(%)

Total
Annual
passenger
rate
revenues
of
growth
(hundred
thousands
of
dollars)
(%)

1942

1,949.7

(16.3)

1,405.8

2.1

73.7

6.8

1943

1,838.5

( 5.7)

1,617.1

15.0

86.0

16.7

1944

2,418.1

31.5

2,161.0

33.6

115.0

33.7

1945

3,784.5

56.5

3,336.3

54.4

164.4

43.0

1946

7,490.4

97.9

5,903.1

76.9

272.6

65.8

1947

9,152.4

22.2

6,016.3

1.9

303.2

11.2

1948

9,980.2

9.0

5,840.2

2.9)

334.7

10.4

1949

11,117.7

11.4

6,570.7

12.5

378.1

13.0

1950

12,385.6

11.4

7,760.0

18.2

430.1

13.8

1951

14,672.0

18.5

10,210.7

31.5

570.3

32.6

1952

18,068.1

23.1

1 2 ,120.8

18.7

671.3

17.7

1953

22,114.8

22.4

14,297.6

18.0

775.8

15.6

1954

25,623.3

15.9

16,234.6

13.5

872.1

12.4

1955

29,978.6

17.0

19,205.7

18.3

1 ,021.1

17.1

1956

33,752.6

12.6

21,643.1

12.7

1,142.2

11.9

1957

39,838.2

18.0

24,499.5

13.2

1,287.2

12.7

1958

40,695.0

2.2

24,435.7

1,363.0

5.9

1959

45,793.2

12.5

28,127.2

1,632.6

19.8

(

(

0.3)
15.1
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Table 4 (continued)

Year

Available
seat
miles

Annual
rate of
growth

Revenue
passenger
miles

Annual
rate of
growth

Total
Annual
passenger
rate
revenues
of
(hundred
thousands

(hundred
thousands)

(%)

(hundred
thousands)

growth

of
(%)

dollars)

(%)

1960

49,153.3

7.3

29,233.2

3.9

1,756.4

7.9

1961

52,525.0

6.9

29,534.8

1.0

1,826.8

4.0

1962

59,736.8

13.7

31,827.8

7.8

2 ,021.0

10.6

1963

67,601.3

13.2

36,383.8

14.3

2,208.4

9.3

1964

75,242.4

11.3

41,658.4

14.5

2,504.9

13.4

1965

88,731.2

17.9

48,987.0

17.6

2,908.0

16.1

1966

97,174.7

9.5

56,802.8

16.0

3,233.1

11.2

1967

124,141.6

27.8

70,990.1

25.0

3,901.5

20.7

1968

153,864.6

23.9

81,611.8

15.0

4,451.3

14.1

1969

178,646.7

16.1

89,184.6

9.3

5,087.5

14.3

1970

182,780.3

2.3

89,410.3

0.3

5,263.6

3.5

1971b

202,509.5

10.8

97,756.1

9.3

6,750.4

28.2

197 2b

206,617.9

2.0

108,190.0

10.7

7,510.5

11.3

1973b

222,446.6

7.7

115,352.2

6.6

8,382.4

11.6

1974b

210,997.1

117,616.3

2.0

8,510.2

1.5

( 3.1)

Q
Parentheses indicate a deficit.
b Includes statistics for Alaska and Hawaii.

Table 4 (continued)
Sources:
Civil Aeronautics B o a r d .
1971 Edition.
Washington, D.C.:

"Handbook o
N.p., 1971.

Airline Statistics,
[ Booklet. ]

Air Transport Association of America.
Washington, D.C.:
N.p., 1974.
[ Booklet. ]

"Air Transport 1974
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statement because of the costs involved not only in the initial p u r 
chase of the airplane, but. also the costs associated with the
complementary equipment and in introducing the aircraft into service.
In the crisis era growth began to slow and fluct’iate.
Economists have recently begun to talk of the airlines as a maturing
industry because of the dramatic decrease in their rate of growth.
Operating profits during this era again fluctuated widely for the
same reasons as in the previous period.

Chapter 6

CORRELATION OF EDUCATION-E X P E R I E N C E ,
N E E D S , AND SUCCESS

On the previous pages the education and experience of various
presidents of the airlines,

the needs of the airline industry by era,

and the success of the industry during the past fifty years have been
analyzed.

In relating these three factors one should note that it is

assumed that a president's
was predominant and,

influence in the operation of his company

therefore, his education and experience were

largely responsible for the orientation of the airline company.

This

is a realistic assumption in that the president of an airline is
usually also the chief operating officer and makes the necessary
day-to-day decisions affecting the company.

Many of the presidents

of the airlines were autocrats and literally made all the decisions
affecting their companies.

This was especially true of the early

presidents.
In this light the following will be considered:

Did m a n a g e 

ment h av e the education and experience to meet the needs of the
airline industry in each era?

To what degree was

the success of the

industry dependent upon the occupational qualifications of management
as reflected in the industry's presidents?

What correlation exists,

if any, between the needs of the industry,

the success of the indus

try, and the education and experience of the presidents of the
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industry?
While most of the early dominant presidents in the airline
industry have backgrounds which fit into the category of general b u s i 
ness experience,
rience.

at least seven out of the ten have had flying expe

These, include C. R. Smith of American Airlines,

Robert F. Six

of Continental Airlines, Eddie Rickenbacker of Eastern Airlines,
George T. Baker of National A i r l i n e s ; Croil Hunter of Northwest
Airlines, Juan Trippe of Pan American Airways,
Trans W orld Airlines.

and Jack Frye of

Some of these presidents have flown profe s

sionally and extensively w hil e others have flown only as barnstormers
before beginning their career with the airlines;

four of these

pioneers have primarily operational backgrounds:
George T. Baker, Juan Trippe,
As mentioned earlier,
operational

in nature.

Robert F. Six,

and Jack Frye.
the needs of this early era were

It was a constant challenge just to keep the

airplanes operating, m uch less on a regular schedule.

Little effort

was given during this period to stimulating passenger traffic or
financial matters.

There was, however, m uch attention given to ne w

mail contracts as this provided additional income.
The success during the early years of commercial aviation was
in the mere existence of the airlines and the industry.

Some carriers

w e r e fortunate enough to w in n e w routes w hi ch allowed for expansion
of their operations, however until 1938 the industry grew very little.
It is evident that there appears to be a very strong corre la
tion during the early years of the airline industry between

management's experience,
companies,

as exemplified by the presidents of the

and the needs of the industry.

The majority of the p r e s i 

dents considered had some flying experience and almost half had
operational backgrounds.

The primary need of the era was of an

operational nature, which management wan well qualified

to handle.

The industry was very successful during this era too, recognizing
its existence through a period of adversity.

The success can be

largely attributed to the ability of management to meet the needs
of the industry,

so there is a strong correlation here also.

As in the early era,
dents of the airlines
category.

a majority of the "growth era" pr e s i 

fit into the. broad general business background

Of the remainder a wide diversity of backgrounds are

represented:

military,

operational,

legal, and marketing.

examining the background of these presidents m ore carefully,

However,
there

appear to be several w i t h experience in the marketing area of b u s i 
ness.

Thomas Braniff of Braniff Airways was an insurance salesman,

Robert F. Six of Continental Airlines was the circulation manager for
a newspaper,

Eddie Rickenbacker of Eastern Airlines was a director

of sales for an aircraft manufacturer, LaMotte T. Cohu of Trans W orld
Airlines was a security salesman,
Airways

and Charles E. Beard of Braniff

(Thomas B r a n i f f 1s successor) had a background predominantly

in the marketing area.
The needs of the growth years were primarily those of an
organizational nature.

The fantastic growth in air transportation

w hi ch occurred after the war and the competition between carriers for

the first time required organ!zation for the preservation of the
industry and continued orderly growth.
The success of this era, as mentioned above, was mixed.

If

growth is the cole measure of success then the airline industry was
tremendously successful.

However,

this position must be moderated.

if operating profits are considered
During this period the airlines

faced several crises which were reflected on the income st at eme nt -three economic recessions and the first major reequipment cycle of
the industry.

Considering both growth and operating profit,

the

industry fared well but by no means achieved the heights industry
proponents and investors of the era predicted.
Taking all of the above into account,

there appears to be

some correlation between the management, needs and success of the
industry during the growth era, but not nearly as defined as in the
early years.

Management was diversified in their backgrounds, although

there was a definite emphasis in the sales and ma rketing area.

The

ma jo r n ee d of the era was organization to deal with the explosive
growth of the industry and the competition between carriers.

Those

presidents w ith some experience in the sales and marketing area were
certainly better equipped to deal wi th the growth and competition of
the era than those with no such experience.
skills,

As for organizational

the background information available is inconclusive.

Broad

business experience is probably m o st helpful in teaching organ iz a
tional skills,
business.

rather than experience in any one particular area of

As was pointed out,

the majority of the presidents of this
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era had broad business exposure.
Success during this era was mixed and depended m uc h on ex te r
nal

factors and m a n a g e m e n t ’s ability to deal wit h them.

therefore,

There appears,

to be some correlation between the success of the industry

and management's ability to meet the needs of the industry.
Approximately half of the presidents during the crisis era
had a broad business background while the remainder had a wide variety
of backgrounds.

There does not appear to be any pattern among m a n a g e 

ment's experience during this era as in the previous era.

Particularly

noteworthy 'is the fact that no president had either a strictly finan
cial background or even a strong experience in finance.
The needs of the crisis era, however,

are ma inl y in the finan

cial area of business as huge quantities of capital were necessary to
refurbish fleets an d facilities for the jet age.
fore,

It appears,

there

that a negative correlation exists between m a n a g e m e n t 1s b a c k 

ground and the needs of this era.
The negative correlation is reflected in the success of the
industry.

The operating profits during the crisis years fluctuated

even more widely than during the growth era.

The industry went from

one extreme to the other during this era--record profits w ere set and
extremely

adverse

results were achieved.

Undoubtedly,

the fact that

management lacked the necessary background to meet the predominant
needs of the industry during this era contributed largely to the
irregular profit pattern of the industry.

Certainly the economic

climate played a m a j o r role in the operating results too, as in the
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previous era.
in rate,

Growth during this era was irregular and fluctuated

although

there was no negative growth.

Chapter 7

CURRENT PROBLEMS OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

The current situation in the airline industry is not favor
able.

Both business and pleasure air travel have declined recently

as real personal disposable income decreased,
unemployment rose,
deteriorated.

air fares rose,

and the chief economic indicators further

The industry earned 247 million dollars during 1974,

48 percent ahead of 1973, because of a number of factors:

Good

domestic traffic most of the year resulting from the gasoline
shortage scare, multi pl e fare increases, and a contraction in
capacity necessitated by the allocation of fuel.'*'
During the first quarter of 1975 the airline industry p e r 
formed poorly and this trend is predicted by many to continue through
out most of the year because of the sluggish economy.

However, a n t i 

recession measures n o w b ein g effected by the government should bring
about a mo re favorable climate for the airline industry after m i d 
year that could be reflected in domestic traffic before fourth
quarter.
With real disposable personal income,

considered by many to be

the most powerful influence on pleasure travel,

likely to enter an

^Standard and Poor, "Industry Surveys--Air Transport,"
April 17, 1975, p. 63.
[ Pamphlet. ]
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uptrend early in the second half of 1975,
rate profits likely to ameliorate,

and the sharp drop in corpo

there should be some positive

forces at w or k that could considerably strengthen prospects as
industry moves into 1976.

the

2

N e w discount fares are hoped to generate a considerable amount
of n e w traffic yet this year.

Further, another domestic fare increase

m a y be fully justified, under Civil Aeronautics Board standards for
considering increases, by mid-1975.
Fuel, w hich nearly doubled in prices during 1974, will
undoubtedly continue to climb in price, however,
than during 1974.

at a much smaller rate

This is assuming that sharp increases

in traffic

and taxes can be avoided and another mid-East confrontation can be
averted.

It is important to note that fuel is still being allocated

to the airlines and will probably continue to be a scarcity for the
indefinite future.

This m a y result in long-term growth being c o n 

strained.
Growth in terms of capacity during the near future will co n
tinue as the industry continues to take delivery of additional
wide -b ody jet aircraft ordered several years ago.
deliveries taper off capital outlays will decline.

As n e w aircraft
Commitments for

n e w equipment during 1975 are forecast at the one billion dollar
level,

down from the 1.4 billion dollars spent during 1974.
3

expenditures should further decline during 1976.

2

I b i d . , p. 64.

^ I b i d . , p . 65.

Capital
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As pointed but previously,

the success of the airline industry

closely parallels the domestic economy and the present time period is
no exception.

The. economy is expected to improve in the second half

of 1975 and further improve during 1976.

It is very likely that

airline industry profits and growth will follow this

trend.

Chapter 8

CURRENT NEEDS OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

The key to healthy profits in the airline business is a high
load factor combined w i t h a low break-even point.

The cost structure

of the airlines is such that fixed costs are high and many of the
variable costs are noncontrollable.

The airlines have huge capital

investments and no control over such costs as fuel and the effects
of inflation.

Therefore,

the major emphasis of the industry should

be not on decreasing the break-even point, but rather on raising load
factors to compensate for the increased costs of operations.
There are two approaches
factors in a competitive market.
’’steal" passengers

for an airline company to raise load
First,

an airline can attempt to

from competition by aggressive marketing programs

or offering special bargains;

second, an airline company can attempt

to stimulate total industry demand for air travel and be content with
its fair share of the n e w business stimulated.
carriers

Unfortunately, most

today have opted for the first alternative.
Some airlines have been very successful in their efforts to

"steal" passengers

from competition to the competitor's detriment.

The classic modern example is National Airlines with the "Fly Me"
campaign.

On the N e w York City to Miami route,

over which National

competes w i t h Eastern Airlines and Delta Air Lines, National suc
ceeded in taking away 40 percent of Eastern's business and 20 percent

92

93
of D a l t a 's .business.
year,

National's profits soared to ne w records

last

largely because of its success against competition, while

Eastern's profits dipped to n e w lows.

Eastern had many problems last

year, but National's success played a major role in its gigantic
loss.
It is evident that by increasing industry demand the whole
industry benefits.

Traffic on all carriers increases and helps all

carriers to combat the increase in costs.
Another technique the industry has to combat the rise in
costs is to increase prices of air travel,
sions during 1974.

However,

as was done on three occa

there is a strong indication that demand

for air travel is very elastic and that as prices go up, demand goes
down.

It then becomes a question of at what fare level are revenues

maximized.

After reaching the point of maximization,

will decrease total revenues because less people will

increasing fares
fly.

The airline industry has very few operational problems at
this point in time due to recent technological advances,
the art, and no recent new aircraft introductions.
for ne w equipment,

the requirements

substantially in the next few years.
however,

for external

the state of

With the decline

financing will drop

Under favorable conditions,

some equity financing may be undertaken to improve the

unfavorable debt/equity ratios of the industry.
In summary,

the primary need of the airline industry today,

and the ne ed for the remainder of this decade, will be to increase
load factors at a pace equal to or exceeding the increase in the
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break-even point.

This appears to be the most effective, weapon

industry has against the increases

the

in operating costs, which are

presently causing and will continue to cause profits

to deteriorate.

Chapter 9

EDUCATION A ND EXPERIENCE OF SELECTED
CURRENT AIR LI NE COMPANY PRESIDENTS

Since the basic need of the airline industry at the present
and in the future is for an increased growth rate in passenger
travel, one w ou ld expect the m a j o ri ty of the current airline p re s i 
dents to have marketing backgrounds
increase in demand.

However,

in order to achieve the needed

such is not the case.

Out of the ten airlines considered,
with operational backgrounds:

four have presidents

Robert F. Six of Continental Airlines;

David C. Garrett, Jr., of Delta A ir Lines;

Floyd D. Hall of Eastern

Airlines; and W il l i a m T. S e a w e l l o f Pan American W orld Airways.
Further, L. B. M ay ta g of National Airlines and F. C. Wiser,
of Trans World Airlines have some operational experience.
is currently licensed to pilot all of the various

Jr.,
Mr. Ma ytag

types of aircraft

his company operates.
Albert V. Casey of Ameri ca n Airlines

is the only airline

president to currently have a financial background, although C. Edward
Acker of Braniff Airways has considerable financial experience.

It

wou ld almost be expected that there w ou l d be m o r e finance-experienced
chief executives at this point in time since financial needs were
the primary need of the industry during the past fifteen years.
Only United Airline's n e w president,
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Richard J. Ferris, has
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had any substantial m a r k eti ng background.

Previous

to his ne w p o s i 

tion, he was ground vice president of marketing services at United,
However,

the rest o f his background is so varied that he is clas si 

fied as having a general business background,
David C. Garrett, Jr.. wo rked in the marketing division of
Delta as the first job of his career, but because of the limited
responsibility and the length of time ago his marketing experience
is considered minimal.
Donald W. N y r o p of Northwest Airlines was

formerly a chair

man of the Civil Aeronautics Board and as such has had considerable
experience in dealing wi th passenger growth, however, he has no
direct marketing experience.

As pointed out previously, Robert F.

Six was a circulation man a g e r for a newspaper company many many
years ago.

Chapter 10

CORRELATION OF CURRENT NEEDS,

PROBLEMS,

AN D P R E S I D E N T S ’ EDUCATION-EXPERIENCE

Again,

as in the crisis era,

there appears to be little

correlation between the needs of the airline industry and the b a c k 
grounds of the airline company presidents.

A marketing background

wo ul d seem necessary to best develop industry sales, however, only
one president has any substantial market ing background.
As for the success of the industry,
ing the pattern set by the economy.

When

it seems to be follow

the economy is booming,

so are airline profits and when the economic situation is deteri
orating,

as at present, airline profits are down.

However,

it appears

that m a n a g e m e n t ’s skills and experience do play a major factor in the
success of the airline,

especially in those periods of economic

adversity.
At the present time, a period of economic adversity,
lK >

4

five of

■* f

the ten airlines studied ma de a profit first quarter while five lost
money.

They all faced the same economic situation so management

mus t be one of the factors that ma d e half of t h e m successful and half
of them unsuccessful.

A c a r r i e r ’s route structure is another factor.

Those airlines w i t h ’m ajor routes to tourist centers suffer adverse
economic consequences m o r e than those carriers with routes primarily
between trade c e n t e r s .
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There appears to be no correlation between the success of the
industry and management's ability to meet the needs of the industry.
Operating results are mixed wh ile in practically no case does m a n a g e 
ment's background meet the needs of the industry.

For example,

National Airlines produced a 6.4 million dollar profit in the first
quarter and its president, L. B. Maytag, has a general business
background w it h a majori ty of his experience in operations.

4

4
"First Quarter Profit Survey," Business W e e k , Ma y 19, 1975,

p. 70.

Chapter 11

VALIDITY OF RESEARCH

As pointed out at the beginning of this research,

it has been

assumed that the president of an airline sets the direction his c o m 
pany takes and is the overwhelming influence on policy and major d ec i
sions.

An assumption of this nature, was ne cessary to ma ke the

correlation analysis of this research.

If the data of all the top

management of the ten airlines studied were included,
grown to such proportions
impossible.

However,

it would have

that any meaningful analysis would have been

this does not m ake the assumption correct.

As is true .in all human nature,
w h o are strong leaders and autocrats.

there are those individuals
On the other hand,

there are

also those individuals w h o are w eaker and content to take a back
seat.

Unfortunately,

it is impossible to differentiate between the

two types of presidents
tion.

in most cases because of a lack of informa

This analysis w o u l d be mu ch mo r e meaningful if it could be

determined w hi ch presidents

influence were truly reflected in the

direction the companies went and w h ic h presidents only played a p a s 
sive role in setting the direction their companies took.
It appears

from the foregoing research that the economy plays

a m a jor role in the success of an airline company and the entire
industry as a whole, and management,
amount of control over success.

therefore, has only a limited

W h e n the economy is booming it is
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ha rd for an airline company not to ma k e a profit, however, when there
is a period of economic adversity the skills of management become
manifest.

It has largely been assumed throughout the foregoing

analysis that the success of an airline is entirely dependent upon
management's direction of the company

(as exemplified by the p r e s i 

dent of the company) .
Further,

the effect of government regulation on the success

of the airline industry has been considered only briefly because of
the very subjective nature of the effect.
ever,

It is evident today, h o w 

that the m a s si ve regulation the industry must comply w it h cuts

deeply into operating profits.

For example,

an airline is not p e r 

mi t t e d to terminate an unprofitable route without the consent of the
Civil Aeronautics Board, w hich is very difficult and time consuming
to obtain.
Because of these three factors,

i.e.,

the assumption that a

president is the major influence in the direction his company takes,
that the economy plays only a mi no r role in the success of an a i r 
line, and the omission of the effects of regulation,
of this research is questionable.

However,

the validity

the area of co ncentra

tion is so subjective that these assumptions w e r e necessary to make
any useful analysis.
The research definitely shows some trends in management,
exemplified by the presidents in the industry,

the needs of the indus

try, and m anagement's qualifications to meet these needs.

The

research also points up the success of the industry; however,

it fails
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to show h ow much of the success or failures of the Industry is
attributable to management's ability to meet the needs of the indus
try.

If the effects of the economy and government regulation could

have been eliminated,

then the determination of ho w management's

ability to meet the needs of the industry and how it effects the
success of the industry could have been m a de w i t h a significant
degree of validity.

Chapter 12

COMPARISON OF CURRENT-HISTORICAL SITUATION;
FORECAST FOR MANAGEMENT; CONCLUSION

Looking to the future,

growth will be a m ajor

factor.

The

reequipment cycle begun w i t h the introduction of wide-body aircraft
has almost been completed and the only problem facing the airlines
in the immediate future is ho w to fill up all those empty seats.
In that increasing passenger loads is the major need of the immediate
future, a marketing-oriented ma nagement appears the most desirable.
The airline industry is beginning to face a period of time
similar to the growth period w hi ch occurred after World War II.
To survive and prosper traffic must increase no w that capacity has
increased,

and expenses along w i t h it.

After the War w hen the

first major reequipment cycle of the industry occurred, management
was faced wit h the problem of h o w to fill up the n e w and larger a i r 
craft wi th passengers,

in order to pay for the aircraft.

precisely the situation at the present time;

This is

the industry has a lot

of n e w expensive larger aircraft that are not paid for yet; and
unless

traffic increases,

they will not be able to pay for them.

Of course, m a n y aircraft today are leased, but leasing costs
are high.

An airline that cannot keep a leased aircraft full of p a s 

sengers cannot prosper either.
Looking toward the 1980s,

there is a likelihood that another
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im
reequipment cycle will occur out of necessity to preserve the aircraft
manuf act ur in g industry.

New aircraft have always been more elaborate

and more expensive than their predecessors.
will once again have a financing problem,
of the 1960s.

At this point,

Therefore,

the airlines

similar to the. crisis era

a finance-oriented management will

become desirable as n e w means will be required to finance the new
purchases.
It appears that the airline industry is headed for a co ntin
uous series of crisis eras and growth eras, which will be triggered
by impending new-type aircraft introductions.
duction will

The impending in tro

trigger the crisis era and the growth era will

follow

as the airlines slowly recover from the financial crisis and begin to
stimulate ne w passenger growth.

The situation probably will not be

as clear-cut as it would seem because the state of the economy will
undoubtedly complicate things.

However,

the cycle will be very

distinct.
Management in the future will,

therefore, need to follow the

particular needs of the era--financial background for the crisis
eras and marke ti ng backgrounds

for the growth eras.

It appears that this cycle of crisis and growth may have been
continuing in the airline industry since Wo rl d War II but for a number
of reasons it has not been made manifest.
After World War II there was plenty of capital available to
the airlines so a crisis era did not really occur when the reequipment
cycle began.

However,

the growth era did mani fe st itself.

The next
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n e w aircraft introduction,

the. beginning of the jet age,

did trigger

a crisis era because capital was not readily available.
A growth period did occur during the late 1960s as is evident
in Table 4, however,

it was short-lived.

another new aircraft introduction,
another crisis era.

At the beginning of the 1970s

the wide-body jets, precipitated

Had the economy been booming during the late

1960s the growth period would have been more pronounced.
At the present time the airlines are. recovering from the
wide-body jet introductions and will undoubtedly seek to stimulate
passenger traffic in the near future,

beginning a growth period.

The

growth period may have already begun in that n ew discount, fares and
advertising campaigns have occurred already during 1975.

However,

the effects of the efforts of the industry are being obscured by the
adverse, economic climate.
The industry m a y already have begun to react to this growth
period in that its newest president,

Richard J. Ferris of United

Airlines, has a strong m ar ke ti ng background.

Perhaps this is the

direction that management will take during the remainder of the
1970s and on into the 1980s until another major reequipment cycle
occurs.
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